



9300 Imperial Highway, Downey, California 90242-2890 • (562) 922-6111

Debra Duardo, M.S.W., Ed.D., *Superintendent*

July 27, 2023

**TO:** Business and Accounting Administrators  
Los Angeles County K-12 School and Community College Districts  
Regional Occupational Centers/Programs (ROC/Ps),  
Other Local Educational Agencies (LEAs), and Selected Charter Schools

**FROM:** Sachiko Enomoto, School Accounting and Finance Manager  
Jenny Zermeño, Disbursements and Financial Systems Manager  
Division of School Financial Services

**SUBJECT:** URGENT NOTIFICATION: ACH Transaction Fraud on the Rise

The Los Angeles County Office of Education, the Division of School Financial Services (SFS) has seen an alarming increase in fraudulent Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions, with large transaction amounts, directly impacting Districts. Notably, 100% of these fraudulent transactions were attributed to electronic email scam impersonating as the genuine vendor. In light of recent events, SFS strongly urges all districts to establish procedures to prevent and mitigate such fraudulent transactions to occur. Districts must take necessary action to ensure safeguarding of public funds.

The following are best practices that should be considered for implementation:

- **Train employees who process payments to properly verify by calling a known contact on file with the district for all payment account changes rather than solely reply to email instructions (Highly Recommended)**
- Sign up for the LA County Early Warning Service to additionally verify a payment account number. Please see [Bulletin #6707 - Introducing Early Warning Services for Added Vendor Account Security Involving Automated Clearing House \(ACH\) Account Number Changes](#) for additional information.
- Train all employees on suspicious email trends and have the District's technology unit send test e-mails regularly
- Consider available email security solutions to defend against lookalike domains
- Enable controls so all emails from outside your District are marked as external

SFS has issued various bulletins highlighting the increase in unauthorized personnel posing as vendor contacts and **emailing** school districts requesting changes to EFT vendor account information. Included in the bulletins were suggestions noted to mitigate risk of fraudulent transactions.

[Bulletin #5213 – Electronic Fund Transfer \(EFT\) Vendor Setup Warning](#)

[Bulletin #5354 – Urgent Warning Regarding Processing Requests to Change Electronic Funds Transfer \(EFT Vendor Setup\)](#)

[Bulletin #6625 – URGENT REMINDER: Warning Regarding Processing Requests to Change Electronic Funds Transfer \(EFT\) Vendor Setup](#)

District business staff should proceed with caution when processing requests for vendor setup and changes. It is crucial that Districts are wary of any unsolicited communication of this nature and are strongly encouraged to develop procedures for authenticating all EFT requests before entering/changing information in BEST Advantage System - Financials (FIN).

Business Email Compromise (BEC) is an electronic scam to obtain confidential, personal or financial information from the Districts through email. The following are examples of BEC that the Los Angeles Treasurer and Tax Collector (TTC) has provided:

- **Email Spoofing/Masking** – A spoofed/masked email that contains a forged email header that hides the true origination of a message. Scammers will trick District employees into divulging sensitive information and/or initiating payments based on fraudulent instructions.
- **Client Email Compromise** – Scammers compromise an employee’s email at the District, often referred to as account takeover or hacking. Scammers leverage access to an email account or District’s network to gain an understanding of the communication style, and ultimately send an email to an employee with fraudulent payment instructions.
- **Vendor Email Compromise** – Scammers impersonate a District’s vendor rather than a District’s employee. A vendor’s client (the District) receive requests with updated accounts, then send funds to what is believed to be a valid account from their trusted vendor.
- **Lookalike Domain** – Scammers purchase/register a domain closely resembling that of a legitimate company, then set up a related email account to target the victim District. Victim Districts’ employees often do not notice the difference between their legitimate corporate domain and the lookalike, which is very similar visually.

***Initial Steps Taken When District Discovers that a Fraudulent EFT/ACH Transaction Occurred:***

1. Immediately contact [SFSBanking@laco.e.edu](mailto:SFSBanking@laco.e.edu) and [SFSAccountsPayable@laco.e.edu](mailto:SFSAccountsPayable@laco.e.edu) to alert SFS of the fraudulent ACH transactions that has occurred.
2. Districts should file a police report with their local police.
3. SFS staff will continue communication with the District to request information needed in order to make efforts to recover the funds.
4. SFS staff in partnership with TTC will make recovering efforts for the funds lost.

**NOTE:** Although every effort will be made to recover the funds lost, there is no guarantee that any of the funds will be recovered. If a district experiences a fraudulent incident, it may then be required for LACOE to review and approve any future vendor account changes.

URGENT NOTIFICATION: ACH Transaction Fraud on the Rise

July 27, 2023

Page 3

For more suggestions on security set-up procedures, please see [Bulletin #5213 \*Electronic Funds Transfer \(EFT\) Vendor Setup Warning\*](#).

If you have any questions regarding this bulletin, please feel free to contact Sachiko Enomoto at (562) 922-6191 or via e-mail at [Enomoto\\_Sachiko@laco.edu](mailto:Enomoto_Sachiko@laco.edu) or Jenny Zermeño at (562) 922-8874 or via e-mail at [Zermeno\\_Jenny@laco.edu](mailto:Zermeno_Jenny@laco.edu).

Approved:

Nkeiurka Benson, Director

Division of School Financial Services

SE/JZ:lt

SFS-A7-2023-2024